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THE SEVERABILITY OF ARBITRABLE AND
NONARBITRABLE SECURITIES CLAIMS
Brokers and dealers generally require investors to enter into written
agreements detailing the terms of the relationship between the broker or dealer
and the investor prior to the establishment of a securities investment account.'
These agreements usually contain clauses that require the arbitration of disputes
arising from the relationship between the investor and the broker or dealer. 2
Notwithstanding the apparent scope of arbitration clauses, agreements to
arbitrate potential future disputes are unenforceable with respect to investors'
claims under the Securities Act of 19333 ('33 Act) and the Securities Exchange
Act of 19344 ('34 Act).5 Historically, brokers and dealers have been under
no obligation to inform investors that predispute arbitration clauses are unen-
forceable with respect to federal securities claims. 6 Many investors, therefore,
may have been unaware that, despite the apparent scope of arbitration clauses,
they may litigate federal securities claims in court.7 The Securities and Exchange
1. See SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-15984 (July 2, 1979), reprinted in
[1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,122, at 81,976 (brokers and dealers routinely
require customers to enter into written agreements prior to opening cash or margin accounts).
2. See H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., Ist Sess. ch. 3, at 390-91 (1963) (major stock ex-
change firms generally use arbitration clauses); SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-15984
(July 2, 1979), reprinted in [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 182,122, at 81,976;
see also Note, Arbitration of Investor-Broker Disputes, 65 CAiJ. L. REv. 120, 121 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as Disputes] (major stock brokerage firms include arbitration clauses in margin and cash
account agreements). Arbitration clauses in security account agreements commonly purport to
bind the investor to arbitration of all potential disputes that may arise between the investor and
the broker or dealer. See 8A C. NIcHoLs, CYCLOPEDIA OF LEGAL Foums ANNOTATED § 8.5362,
at 496 (1980) (text of standard arbitration clause requires settlement of any controversy by
arbitration). Arbitration clauses also generally include procedures for selection of an arbitration
forum. See id. (investor may choose to arbitrate disputes in accordance with rules of any one
of several arbitration associations).
3. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1982) (Securities Act of 1933 ('33 Act)).
4. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1982) (Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ('34 Act)).
5. See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 434-35 (1953) (predispute arbitration agreement is
void and unenforceable with respect to claims arising under '33 Act); Reader v. Hirsch & Co.,
197 F. Supp. 111, 116 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) (predispute arbitration agreements are void and unen-
forceable with respect to claims arising under '34 Act); see also infra notes 29-44 (discussion
of Wilko doctrine); infra notes 45-47 (discussion of extension of Wilko doctrine to '34 Act claims).
6. See SEC Securities Act Release No. 34-20397 (Nov. 18, 1983), reprinted in [Current]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 83,452, at 86,357 (arbitration agreements historically have contained
language purporting to bind investors to arbitration of all disputes); SEC Securities Exchange
Release No. 34-15984 (July 2, 1979), reprinted in [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH)
82,122, at 81,975 (brokers and dealers commonly use arbitration clauses which imply that in-
vestors must submit future federal securities disputes to arbitration); see also Disputes, supra
note 2, at 148-49 (securities industry continues to use boilerplate arbitration clauses purporting
to bind investors to arbitration of all disputes despite unenforceability of clauses with respect
to arbitration of federal securities claims).
7. See SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-15984 (July 2, 1979), reprinted in
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Commission (SEC), however, recently adopted rule 15c2-28 prohibiting the
use of predispute arbitration clauses that purport to bind investors to arbitrate
federal securities claims." Rule 15c2-2 requires brokers and dealers to inform
potential and existing customers that arbitration clauses do not preclude judicial
recourse for the resolution of federal securities disputes." The enactment of
rule 15c2-2 may result in the increased litigation of securities disputes as more
investors pursue the resolution of federal securities claims in court."
Securities claims based on state law generally are subject to arbitration
pursuant to valid arbitration agreements. 2 For example, common-law claims
[1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 182,122, at 81,975 (investors frequently are
unaware of their right to pursue federal securities claims in court because brokers and dealers
do not inform investors of enforceability limits of arbitration clauses).
8. 48 Fed. Reg. 53404 (1983) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-2).
9. See SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-20397 (Nov. 18, 1983), reprinted in
[Current] FED. SEc. L. RaP. (CCH) 183,452, at 86,356 (announcing adoption of rule 15c2-2).
Rule 15c2-2 declares that the use of arbitration agreements that purport to bind investors to the
arbitration of future disputes arising under the federal securities laws is fraudulent. 48 Fed. Reg.
53404, 53406-07 (1983) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-2). Rule 15c2-2 includes a provi-
sion that allows brokers and dealers to continue use of existing supplies of customer agreement
forms containing objectionable clauses upon the condition that the brokers and dealers include
a written disclosure that the customer is not bound to arbitrate federal securities disputes. Id.
at 53407. As of January 1, 1985, however, rule 15c2-2 will prohibit brokers and dealers from
executing customer agreements that purport to bind investors to arbitrate future federal securities
disputes, irrespective of any disclosure of the limited effect of the agreement. Id.; see SEC Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 34-20397 (Nov. 18, 1983), reprinted in [Current] FED. SEc. L. REP.
(CCH) 83,452, at 86,358-59 (provision of proposed rule 15c2-2 allowing permanent use of disclosure
language deleted as insufficient notice to investors).
10. 48 Fed. Reg. 53404, 53407 (1983) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-2).
11. See SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-20397 (Nov. 18, 1983) reprinted in
[Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 83,452, at 86,356 (purpose of rule 15c2-2 is to ensure that
public customers are aware of availability of judicial recourse with respect to federal securities
claims).
12. See Arbitration Act, Pub. L. No. 80-282, § 2, 61 Stat. 669 (1947) (codified at 9 U.S.C.
§ 2 (1982)) (written arbitration agreements constitute valid, irrevocable, and enforceable con-
tracts); see also infra notes 81-91 and accompanying text (discussion of Arbitration Act).
Congress passed the Arbitration Act to overcome an anachronism of American common
law. H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1924) [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No. 96];
S. REP. No. 536, 68th Cong., Ist Sess. 2 (1924) [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 536]. A common-law
principle that courts would not enforce arbitration agreements upon the ground that arbitration
agreements wrongly deprived courts of jurisdiction had evolved because of the jealousy of the
English courts for their own jurisdiction. H.R. REP No. 96, supra at 1-2. Congress enacted the
Arbitratioi Act to eliminate this common-law principle and place arbitration agreements on the
same footing as other contracts. Id. at 1; see The Anaconda v. American Sugar Refining Co.,
322 U.S. 42, 44 (1944) (by enactment of Arbitration Act, Congress overturned existing rule that
courts of equity and admiralty could not compel performance of arbitration agreements). See
generally Cohen & Dayton, The New FederalArbitration Law, 12 VA. L. Ray. 265 (1926) (discussion
of Arbitration Act).
The Arbitration Act creates a body of federal substantive law applicable in both state and
federal courts. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 104 S.Ct. 852, 858-59 (1984) (California state
courts must enforce valid arbitration agreement despite state statute to contrary); Georgia Power
Co. v. Cimarron Coal Corp., 526 F.2d 101, 107 (6th Cir. 1975) (federal law under Arbitration
Act controls determination of arbitrability of coal supply agreement between parties), cert. denied,
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of breach of contract, fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and other tort claims
constitute arbitrable state-based claims.' 3 Investors frequently assert state
statutory and common-law claims in addition to federal securities claims in
securities disputes.' 4 The possibility of recovering punitive damages is a primary
reason that investors plead state-based causes of action.' An investor may
not recover punitive damages for violations of the federal securities acts, but
may recover punitive damages under common-law claims.' 6 Investors, therefore,
425 U.S. 952 (1976). Section 2, the central provision of the Arbitration Act, states that written
arbitration agreements are valid, irrevocable, and enforceable contracts. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1982);
see S. REp. No. 536, supra, at 2.
13. See Liskey v. Oppenheimer & Co., 717 F.2d 314, 320-21 (6th Cir. 1983) (investor's
claims of breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, common-law negligence, and violations
of state securities and consumer protection laws are subject to arbitration pursuant to valid predispute
agreement); Dickinson v. Heinold Sec., Inc., 661 F.2d 638, 640 (7th Cir. 1981) (various state
law tort and contract claims arbitrated); Kavit v. A.L. Stam & Co., 491 F.2d 1176, 1181 (2d
Cir. 1974) (common-law negligence and conversion claims are arbitrable), DeHart v. Moore, 424
F. Supp. 55, 56-57 (S.D. Fla. 1976) (common-law fraud and misrepresentation claims are subject
to arbitration pursuant to agreement).
14. See, e.g., Dickinson v. Heinold Sec., Inc., 661 F.2d 638, 640 (7th Cir. 1981) (tort and
contract claims); Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., 637 F.2d 318, 325 (5th Cir. 1981) (claims based
on common-law breach of fiduciary duty and.state consumer protection statute); Mansbach v.
Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017, 1021 (6th Cir. 1979) (claims of statutory fraud and
common-law fraud); Weissbuch v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 558 F.2d 831,
832 (7th Cir. 1977) (allegations of breach of contract and common-law fraud and deceit); Cunn-
ingham v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 550 F. Supp. 578, 578-79 (E.D. Cal. 1982) (allegations
of fraud, breach of fiduciary duties, negligent misrepresentation, and intentional infliction of
emotional distress); Newman v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 383 F. Supp. 265, 266 (W.D. Tex.
1974) (allegations of state securities act violations).
15. See Krause, Securities Litigation: The Unsolved Problem of Predispute Arbitration
Agreementsfor Pendent Claims, 29 DE PAUL L. Rav. 693, 709 (1980) (investors commonly assert
state law claims with federal securities claims to recover punitive damages).
16. See, e.g., Flaks v. Koegel, 504 F.2d 702, 707 (2d Cir. 1974) (damages recoverable on
claim of common-law fraud); Coffee v. Permian Corp., 474 F.2d 1040, 1044-45 (5th Cir.) (damages
recoverable for violation of state fraud statute), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 920 (1973); Young v.
Taylor, 466 F.2d 1329, 1337-38 (10th Cir. 1972) (violation of state blue sky law and common-law.
fraud claim). The damages sections of the '33 Act, §§ 11(e) and 12(2), do not authorize recovery
of punitive damages. See Avern Trust v. Clarke, 415 F.2d 1238, 1242 (7th Cir. 1969) (punitive
damages are not recoverable under § 11(e) of '33 Act); Schaefer v. First Nat'l Bank, 326 F.
Supp. 1186, 1193 (N.D. Ill. 1970) (§ 12(2) of '33 Act does not authorize recovery of punitive
damages), appeal dismissed, 465 F.2d 234 (7th Cir. 1972); see also 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1982)
(§ 11(e) of '33 Act limits damages recovery to compensatory damages); id. § 771(2) (§ 12(2) of
'33 Act allows recovery of loss due to decline in security value plus interest only). Punitive damages
also are not recoverable in an implied cause of action under § 17(a) of the '33 Act. See Globus
v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1283-86 (2d Cir. 1969) (court may not award punitive
damages for § 17(a) claim), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970); see also 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1982)
(§ 17(a) of '33 Act prohibits fraud in offer and sale of securities). The '34 Act also does not
authorize recovery of punitive damages. See Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291, 302-03 (2d
Cir. 1968) (courts interpret § 28(a) of '34 Act to bar recovery of punitive damages although original
aim of § 28(a) limitation to actual damages was prevention of double recovery under state and
federal law), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 977 (1969); 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1982) (§ 28(a) of '34 Act
expressly limits recovery to actual damages); see also Straub v. Vaismon & Co., 540 F.2d 591,
599 (3d Cir. 1976) (no punitive damages recoverable in actions arising under rule IOb-5). See
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commonly combine state-based claims with federal securities claims." Since
federal securities claims are not subject to arbitration and state-based claims
generally are arbitrable, securities disputes that present both state and federal
claims require courts to determine the appropriate forum for the resolution
of these disputes.' 8
The federal courts have not adopted a consistent approach for resolving
securities disputes presenting both arbitrable state claims and nonarbitrable
federal claims.' 9 Some courts have decided to adopt a "sever and stay"
approach.2" Courts employing the sever and stay approach sever the state claims
from the federal securities claims, adjudicate the federal claims, and submit
the state claims to arbitration following judicial resolution of the federal
claims.2" Other courts have decided to exercise jurisdiction to adjudicate both
the state and federal claims when the claims are sufficiently "intertwined. ' 22
generally Comment, Punitive Damages and the Federal Securities Act: Recovery Via Pendent
Jurisdiction 47 Miss. L.J. 743 (1976) (discussion of propriety of punitive damages awards for
pendent state claims); Comment, The Reappearance of Punitive Damages in Private Actions for
Securities Fraud, 5 TEx. TECH. L. REv. 111 (1973) (discussion of punitive damages in securities
disputes).
17. See, e.g., Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., 637 F.2d 318, 323 (5th Cir. 1981) (rule lOb-5
claim with common-law fiduciary duty and Texas consumer protection statute claims); Mansbach
v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017, 1021 (6th Cir. 1979) ('34 Act claim with statutory
fraud and common-law fraud claims); Weissbuch v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
558 F.2d 831, 832 (7th Cir. 1977) (rule lOb-5 claim with fraud, deceit, and breach of contract
claims); Sibley v. Tandy Corp., 543 F.2d 540, 542 (5th Cir. 1976) (rule lOb-5 claims with contract
claims), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 824 (1977); Kavit v. A.L. Stamm & Co., 491 F.2d 1176, 1181
(2d Cir. 1974) ('34 Act claims with common-law negligence and conversion claims); Cunningham
v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 550 F. Supp. 578, 578 (E.D. Cal. 1982) (claims under §§ 10(b)
and 15(c) of '34 Act with state-based claims of fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, negligent misrepresen-
tation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress); Newman v. Shearson, Hammill & Co.,
383 F. Supp. 265, 266 (W.D. Tex. 1974) (various claims of '33 Act and '34 Act violations with
claim of Texas securities act violation).
18. See Krause, supra note 15, at 709-10 (courts have developed guidelines for determining
jurisdiction over mixed claim disputes).
19. Compare infra notes 92-104 and accompanying text (discussion of cases employing in-
tertwining doctrine) with infra notes 105-126 and accompanying text (discussion of cases employ-
ing sever and stay approach).
20. See Liskey v. Oppenheimer & Co., 717 F.2d 314, 320 (6th Cir. 1983) (courts should
sever state clams from federal securities claims and submit state claims to arbitration pursuant
to valid arbitration clauses); Dickinson v. Heinold Sec., Inc., 661 F.2d 638, 644-46 (7th Cir.
1981) (practice of severance of state claims and stay of arbitration supports strong federal policy
favoring arbitration without sacrificing goals of federal securities acts); see also infra notes 105-126
and accompanying text (discussion of sever and stay approach).
21. See Dickinson v. Heinold Sec., Inc., 661 F.2d 638, 643-44 (7th Cir. 1981) (stay of
arbitration of state claims pending completion of litigation of federal claims preserves exclusive
jurisdiction of courts over nonarbitrable federal claims).
22. See Belke v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 693 F.2d 1023, 1026-27 (11th
Cir. 1982) (alleged violations of federal securities laws and common law of Florida based on
mismanagement of investor's portfolio are inextricably intertwined); Miley v. Oppenheimer &
Co., 637 F.2d 318, 335-36 (5th Cir. 1981) (courts should resolve entire dispute when investor
alleges single legal wrong with alternate routes of recovery under state and federal claims); Sibley
v. Tandy Corp., 543 F.2d 540, 543 (5th Cir. 1976) (courts should consolidate and hear state
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Federal courts, however, have differed in their application of the intertwining
doctrine. 23 Some courts have held that state and- federal claims based on the
same facts are intertwined.2 4 Other courts have employed an intertwining test
analogous to the test for the exercise of pendent federal subject matter
jurisdiction.2" Still other courts have held that federal and state securities claims
are intertwined when the resolution of the federal claims requires the court
to consider the same facts, legal issues, and evidence that support the state
claims.16 Courts invoking the intertwining doctrine have refused to submit the
and federal claims when impractical or impossible to separate arbitrable state claims from non-
arbitrable federal claims), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 824 (1977); Frogner v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 199,504, at 96,927 (N.D. Cal. Sept.
26, 1983) (arbitration of state claims would be duplicative if state and federal claims rest on
same factual and legal questions); Cunningham v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 550 F. Supp.
578, 584-85 (E.D. Cal. 1982) (Congress did not intend Arbitration Act to require arbitration
of all arbitrable claims irrespective of joinder of arbitrable claims with nonarbitrable claims);
Seymour v. Bache & Co., [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,402, at
99,058 (S.D.N.Y.) (common-law claim of breach of fiduciary duties intertwined with '34 Act
claims), aff'd mem., 538 F.2d 313 (2d Cir. 1976); Macchiavelli v. Shearson, Hammill & Co.,
384 F. Supp. 21, 31 (E.D. Cal. 1974) (intertwining doctrine requires litigation of state claims
not factually and legally severable from federal securities claims); Shapiro v. Jaslow, 320 F. Supp.
598, 600 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (arbitration of common-law claims would render exclusive jurisdiction
of federal courts over federal securities claims meaningless); see also infra notes 92-104 and ac-
companying text (discussion of intertwining doctrine).
23. See infra notes 24-27 and accompanying text (discussion of varying applications of in-
tertwining doctrine).
24. See Belke v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 693 F.2d 1023, 1026-27 (11th
Cir. 1982) (factual severability of state and federal claims is determinative of question of applicability
of intertwining doctrine to litigate all claims); Seymour v. Bache & Co., [1975-76 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,402, at 99,058 (S.D.N.Y.) (presence of complex and factually in-
tertwined issues requires consolidation of common-law and federal securities claims in one pro-
ceeding), aff'd mem., 538 F.2d 313 (2d Cir. 1976); Macchiavelli v. Shearson, Hammill & Co.,
384 F. Supp. 21, 31 (E.D. Cal. 1974) (invocation of intertwining doctrine requires finding that
federal law issues and state law issues are inseparable).
25. See Sibley v. Tandy Corp., 543 F.2d 540, 543 (5th Cir. 1976) (courts should exercise
jurisdiction to decide state claims that would be impractical to separate from federal securities
claims), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 824 (1977); Shapiro v. Jaslow, 320 F. Supp. 598, 600 (S.D.N.Y.
1970) (court should decide pendent common-law claims).
Pendent subject matter jurisdiction allows a federal court exercising jurisdiction over a federal
claim to decide a related state claim over which the federal court otherwise would not have had
original jurisdiction. See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966) (court prop-
erly exercised jurisdiction to decide both state claim of unlawful interference with contract and
federal claim of violation of federal statute). Exercise of pendent jurisdiction requires that the
federal claim be substantial, that the state and federal claims derive from a common nucleus
of operative fact, and that a plaintiff ordinarily would expect to try all claims in a single pro-
ceeding. Id. While satisfaction of the three requirements for pendent jurisdiction establishes the
constitutional power of a federal court to decide a pendent state claim, the exercise of that power
by a federal court is discretionary. Id. at 726-28. A federal court should address the considera-
tions of judicial economy and convenience and fairness to the litigants before exercising discre-
tion to decide pendent claims. Id. at 726; see Liskey v. Oppenheimer & Co., 717 F.2d 314, 321
(6th Cir. 1982) (courts should exercise power to decide pendent claims sparingly).
26. See Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., 637 F.2d 318, 335-36 (5th Cir. 1981) (courts should
decide state claims when resolutions of state and federal securities claims rely on drawing iden-
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state claims to arbitration pursuant to existing arbitration agreements and have
asserted jurisdiction over the state claims." The intertwining doctrine and the
sever and stay approach represent the differing approaches taken by federal
courts in determining the appropriate forum for the resolution of disputes
presenting both arbitrable state-based securities claims and nonarbitrable federal
securities claims.28
In Wilko v. Swan, 9 the United States Supreme Court held that predispute
arbitration agreements between brokers or dealers and investors are unen-
forceable with respect to federal securities claims arising under the '33 Act.2 0
In Wilko, an investor brought suit in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York against a securities brokerage firm to recover
damages under the civil liability provisions of section 12(2) of the '33 Act. 3'
The investor claimed that the investment firm had induced him to purchase
shares of stock by falsely representing the value of the stock.12 The investor,
in Wilko, invoked federal jurisdiction under section 22(a) of the '33 Act.
3
1
tical factual and legal conclusions from common evidentiary facts); Frogner v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 99,504, at 96,927 (N.D. Cal.
Sept. 26, 1983) (claims based on same factual and legal issues requiring consideration of identical
evidence are intertwined); Cunningham v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 550 F. Supp. 578, 582
(E.D. Cal. 1983) (arbitration that considers same evidence as court considers to decide identical
legal and factual questions is inefficient).
27. See Belke v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 693 F.2d 1023, 1024-25 (1 1th
Cir. 1982) (alleged violations of federal securities laws and state common-law principles based
on mismanagement of investor's account); Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., 637 F.2d 318, 323 (5th
Cir. 1981) (excessive trading of account in violation of common-law fiduciary duty and '34 Act
provisions); Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017, 1019-21 (6th Cir. 1979) (claims
of '34 Act violations and state statutory and common-law fraud resulting from alleged mishandl-
ing of investor's account); Sibley v. Tandy Corp., 543 F.2d 540, 541-42 (5th Cir. 1976) (breach
of contract and '34 Act claims), cert. denied, 434 U.S 824 (1977); Frogner v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. [Current] Fan. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 199,504, at 96,927 (N.D. Cal.
Sept. 26, 1983) ('33 Act claims and alleged violations of state statutes based on fraud); Seymour
v. Bache & Co., [1975-76 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,402, at 99,057 (S.D.N.Y.)
(common-law fiduciary duty and '34 Act claims), affd mem., 538 F.2d 313 (2d Cir. 1976); Shapiro
v. Jaslow, 320 F. Supp. 598, 599-600 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (general allegation of common-law viola-
tions combined with '33 Act and '34 Act claims).
28. See infra notes 92-126 and accompanying text (discussion of intertwining doctrine and
sever and stay approach).
29. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
30. Id. at 438.
31. Wilko v. Swan, 107 F. Supp. 75, 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1952), rev'd, 201 F.2d 439 (2d Cir.),
rev'd, 346 U.S. 427 (1953); see Securities Act of 1933, § 12(2), 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1982) (§ 12(2)
of '33 Act creates civil liability for material misrepresentations by any person who offers or sells
securities).
32. See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 428-29 (1953). In Wilko v. Swan, an investor alleged
that the investment firm of Hayden, Stone and Company had induced the investor to purchase
1,600 shares of the common stock of Air Associates, Inc. by falsely representing that the Air
Associates stock would be valued at $6.00 per share over the then current market price upon
the merger of Air Associates with the Borg Warner Corporation. Id. The investor sold the stock
at a loss two weeks following the purchase. Id. at 429.
33. Id.; see 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (1982) (§ 22(a) of '33 Act creates concurrent jurisdiction
1170
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Section 22(a) creates concurrent jurisdiction in state and federal courts for
adjudication of claims under the '33 Act and the rules and regulations pro-
mulgated thereunder.14 The investment firm moved to stay the trial in the
federal district court, pursuant to section 3 of the federal Arbitration Act,
3
1
pending arbitration in accordance with the terms of a written agreement be-
tween the investment firm and the investor.36 The district court denied the
investment firm's motion to stay the proceedings. 37 The Second Circuit held
that the '33 Act did not prohibit the use of predispute arbitration agreements
and reversed the district court.3 8 The Supreme Court reversed the Second Cir-
cuit and held that a predispute arbitration agreement constitutes a waiver of
an investor's right to select a judicial forum. Section 14 of the '33 Act pro-
vides that any condition, stipulation, or provision that requires an investor
to waive compliance with any provision of the '33 Act is void.' The Wilko
Court reasoned that the right of an investor to bring suit in federal court,
4
and thereby to benefit from a wide choice of venue and broad service of
process,' 2 constituted a "provision" of the '33 Act that was not subject to
waiver. 4 3 Since section 14 voids any stipulation waiving compliance with any
provision of the '33 Act, the Wilko Court concluded that predispute arbitra-
tion agreements are void and unenforceable with respect to claims under the
'33 Act.
4 4
in state and federal courts for adjudication of '33 Act claims).
34. 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (1982).
35. See 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1982) (§ 3 of Arbitration Act requires courts to stay litigation pending
arbitration of claims pursuant to written agreements between parties).
36. See Wilko, 107 F. Supp. at 77. When the investor in Wilko established a margin account
with Hayden, Stone and Company, the investor and the investment firm executed a written agree-
ment providing for the arbitration of all future disputes between the investor and the investment
firm. Id.
37. See id. at 79. The district court in Wilko held that the congressional policy of protec-
ting investors required the litigation of the federal securities claims. Id.
38. See Wilko v. Swan, 201 F.2d 439, 445 (2d Cir.), rev'd, 346 U.S 427 (1953). In reversing
the lower court's decision in Wilko, the Second Circuit held that the congressional policy favor-
ing arbitration, as embodied in the Arbitration Act, overrides the '33 Act policy of investor pro-
tection. Id.
39. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 434-35.
40. 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1982) (§ 14 of '33 Act).
41. Id. § 77v(a).
42. See id. (§ 22(a) of '33 Act permits investors to bring suit in any district in which defen-
dant can be found, transacts business, or made offer or sale, and permits service of process wherever
defendant is inhabitant, or can be found).
43. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 434-35.
44. Id.; see 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1982) (§ 14 of '33 Act). The Wilko doctrine does not preclude
enforcement of agreements to arbitrate existing disputes. See Wilko, 346 U.S. at 438-39 (Jackson,
J., concurring) (parties may agree to arbitrate existing controversies); see also Kribs v. Bache,
Halsey, Stuart, Shields, Inc., [1982-83 Transfer Binder] FED. Sac. L. REP. (CCH) 99,017 at
94,817 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (investor's choice of arbitration tribunal and counterclaim alleging gross
mismanagement of investor's securities account constituted agreement to submit existing federal
securities claim to arbitration); Note, Enforceability of Arbitration Agreements in Fraud Actions
under the Securities Act, 62 YALE L.J. 985, 994-96 (1953) (discussion of voluntary submission
of existing federal securities claims to arbitration).
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Although the Supreme Court has never decided whether predispute ar-
bitration clauses are unenforceable with respect to claims arising under the
'34 Act, federal courts have extended the Wilko doctrine to claims under the
'34 Act.4 5 Section 27 of the '34 Act provides that federal district courts shall
have exclusive jurisdiction over claims arising under the '34 Act and the rules
and regulations promulgated thereunder. 4 , Section 29(a) of the '34 Act is a
nonwaiver provision analogous to section 14 of the '33 Act. 47 Relying on the
Wilko Court's interpretation of the nonwaiver provision of the '33 Act, courts
have interpreted section 29(a) to render predispute arbitration agreements void
with respect to claims based on the '34 Act.
48
In Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co.,49 the United States Supreme Court ad-
dressed, but did not decide, whether to extend the Wilko doctrine to claims
arising under the '34 Act.5 In Scherk, Alberto-Culver, an American com-
pany, contracted for the purchase of businesses owned by Fritz Scherk, a Ger-
man citizen.5' The sales contract contained an agreement to arbitrate all disputes
before the International Chamber of Commerce, in Paris, France.52 Upon
discovering the breach of certain express contract provisions, Alberto-Culver
filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois
45. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Moore, 590 F.2d 823, 827-29 (10th
Cir. 1978) (policy of nonwaiver provision of '33 Act embodied in '34 Act nonwaiver provision),
Weissbuch v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 558 F.2d 831, 835-36 (7th Cir. 1977)
(Wilko doctrine applies to rule lOb-5 implied rights of action); Ayres v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 538 F.2d 532, 536-37 (3d Cir.) (prospective waiver of right to judicial
resolution of any federal securities claim is inconsistent with investor protection policy of securities
acts), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1010 (1976); Newman v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 383 F. Supp.
265, 268 (W.D. Tex. 1974) (reasoning of Wilko compels extension of doctrine to '34 Act claims);
Maheu v. Reynolds & Co., 282 F. Supp. 423, 428-29 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (neither '33 Act claims
nor '34 Act claims of fraud are subject to arbitration); Stockwell v. Reynolds & Co., 252 F.
Supp. 215, 219-21 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (Wilko doctrine applies to preclude enforcement of predispute
agreement to arbitrate fraud claims under '34 Act); Reader v. Hirsch & Co., 197 F. Supp. I11,
116 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) (congressional policy of protecting investors, as evidenced by implication
of private rights of action, requires extension of Wilko doctrine to '34 Act claims). Congress
also apparently has accepted the view that the Wilko doctrine applies to preclude enforcement
of predispute arbitration agreements with respect to claims under rule lOb-5. See H.R. RP. No.
229, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. 111, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 321, 342
(acknowledgement that 1975 amendments to '34 Act do not alter existing law under Wilko doctrine).
46. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1982) (§ 27 of '34 Act).
47. Id. § 78cc(a) (§ 29(a) of '34 Act voids any condition, stipulation, or provision binding
any person to waive compliance with any provision of '34 Act).
48. See supra note 45 and accompanying text (cases extending Wilko doctrine to '34 Act
claims).
49. 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
50. Id. at 513-14.
51. Id. at 508. In Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., Alberto-Culver contracted to purchase
three business entities ovTned by Scherk operating in Germany and Liechtenstein. Id. The sales
contract contained express warranties in which Scherk guaranteed the transfer of complete and
unencumbered ownership of trademarks in cosmetic goods. Id.
52. Id. The contract for the sale of the business entities owned by Scherk stipulated that
the laws of the state of Illinois, Alberto-Culver's principal place of business, would apply in
any arbitration proceedings. Id.
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alleging that Scherk had made fraudulent representations in violation of sec-
tion 10(b) of the '34 Acts3 and rule lOb- 5 -4 promulgated thereunder.5 Scherk
moved to stay the district court proceedings pending arbitration pursuant to
the terms of the sales contract.- 6 Relying on the Wilko doctrine, the district
court denied Scherk's motion and granted a preliminary injunction to prevent
Scherk from proceeding with arbitration." The Seventh Circuit affirmed the
district court's decision.58 The Supreme Court, however, reversed the judg-
ment of the Seventh Circuit and held that the arbitration agreement between
the parties was enforceable.5 9
In Scherk, the Supreme Court acknowledged an argument that the Wilko
doctrine should not apply to claims under the '34 Act. 60 The argument that
the Wilko doctrine does not apply to '34 Act claims recognizes that section
12(2) of the '33 Act provides investors with a private remedy for civil liability.6'
No analogous provision exists in the '34 Act. 62 Neither section 10(b) of the
'34 Act nor rule lOb-5 creates an express private remedy.63 Furthermore, unlike
the provision of the '33 Act creating concurrent jurisdiction in state and federal
courts, the jurisdictional provision of the '34 Act provides exclusive jurisdic-
tion in the federal courts. 64 The Scherk Court acknowledged that the lack of
an express private remedy and the restriction of an investor's choice of forum
53. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982) (§ 10(b) of '34 Act prohibits use of manipulative and decep-
tive devices in purchase or sale of securities).
54. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1983). Pursuant to its rulemaking authority under § 10(b) of
the '34 Act, the SEC promulgated rule 1Ob-5, a general antifraud provision, to identify practices
that violate § 10(b). See id. Rule lob-5 proscribes the employment of all manipulative and decep-
tive devices in the purchase and sale of securities. See id.
55. Scherk, 417 U.S. at 509. In Scherk, Alberto-Cuver discovered that trademark rights
in cosmetic goods which Alberto-Culver had purchased from Scherk were subject to substantial
encumbrances in violation of the contract for sale of Scherk's business entities to Alberto-Culver. Id.
56. Id. Alberto-Culver opposed Scherk's motion for a stay and sought a preliminary in-
junction restraining the prosecution of arbitration proceedings. Id. at 510. The memorandum
opinion of the district court in Scherk is unreported. See id. at 510 n.3.
57. Id. at 510.
58. See Alberto-Culver Co. v. Scherk, 484 F.2d 611, 615 (7th Cir. 1973), rev'd, 417 U.S.
506 (1974). The Seventh Circuit upheld the district court's grant of an injunction in Scherk, reasoning
that the Wilko doctrine requires the litigation of all federal securities claims, irrespective of the
international nature of the dispute. Id.
59. See Scherk, 417 U.S. at 520-21. The Supreme Court distinguished Scherk from Wilko
on the grounds that Scherk involved an international agreement and, therefore, raised different
policy considerations. Id.
60. Id. at 513-14.
61. Id. at 513; see supra note 31 and accompanying text (discussion of § 12(2) of '33 Act).
62. Scherk, 417 U.S. at 513.
63. Id. at 513-14. An implied right of action exists under rule lOb-5. Superintendent of
Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 11-12 (1971); see infra note 79 (discussion
of implied rights of action under '34 Act). The Supreme Court, however, has indicated that courts
should be restrictive in their implication of private rights of action under the '34 Act to avoid
vexatious litigation. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 739 (1975).
64. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (1982) (§ 22(a) of '33 Act creates concurrent jurisdiction
in state and federal courts over '33 Act claims) with id. § 78aa (federal courts have exclusive
jurisdiction over '34 Act claims).
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under the '34 Act may imply that the Wilko doctrine should not control the
question of the enforceability of predispute arbitration agreements with respect
to claims under the '34 Act. 65 The Scherk Court, however, did not decide
whether the Wilko doctrine applies to '34 Act claims, but upheld the en-
forceability of the arbitration clause by distinguishing the facts of the Scherk
case from the facts of the Wilko case. 6" The Scherk Court reasoned that the
international nature of the agreement between Scherk and Alberto-Culver raised
considerations and policies significantly different from those present in Wilko.67
The Scherk Court explained that arbitration agreements between parties to
an international agreement are necessary to maintain the orderliness and predic-
tability essential to efficient international business transactions." The Supreme
Court concluded that policy considerations favoring facilitation of interna-
tional commerce require the enforcement of valid arbitration agreements. 9
Subsequent lower court cases have limited the Scherk holding to its facts, and,
absent a significant international character to the agreement, have continued
to apply the Wilko doctrine to prohibit enforcement of predispute arbitration
agreements with respect to '34 Act claims. 70 The lower courts have recognized
that neither the differences between the rights granted by the '33 and '34 Acts
nor any policy considerations warrant a distinction between '33 and '34 Act
claims with respect to the enforceability of predispute arbitration agreements.
71
The Wilko doctrine's preclusion of the enforcement of predispute arbitra-
tion agreements effectuates the policy of the '33 Act. 72 The main purpose of
the '33 Act is to protect investors from fraud and misrepresentation in the
sale of securities. 73 The Wilko Court recognized that arbitration lacks many
65. Scherk, 417 U.S. at 514.
66. Id. at 515-18.
67. Id. The Scherk Court reasoned that contractual provisions specifying the forum for
the resolution of future disputes are essential to the orderliness and predictability of international
business transactions. Id. at 516. In particular, enforcement of predispute arbitration agreements
between parties to an international agreement allows courts to avoid confronting difficult con-
flicts of law questions in the resolution of international disputes. Id. at 516-17.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 519-20.
70. See Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017, 1030 (6th Cir. 1979) (Wilko
doctrine applies to rule lob-5 claim for mishandling of investor's account); Weissbuch v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 558 F.2d 831, 834-36 (7th Cir. 1977) (same policy con-
siderations underlie '33 and '34 Acts and, therefore, Wilko doctrine applies equally to '34 Act
claims); Ayres v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 538 F.2d 532, 538-39 (3d Cir.)
(§ 28(b) of '34 Act prohibits predispute waiver of '34 Act provisions), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1010 (1976); Newman v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 383 F. Supp. 265, 268 (W.D. Tex. 1974)
(Scherk does not overrule Wilko, but creates limited exception applicable only to international
transactions); see also SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-15984 (July 2, 1979), reprinted
in [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 82,122, at 81,977 (SEC recognizes that
Wilko doctrine is applicable to '34 Act claims).
71. See supra notes 45 & 70 and accompanying text (discussion of extension of Wilko doc-
trine to '34 Act claims).
72. See infra notes 73-77 (discussion of policy of '33 Act).
73. S. REP. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1933). Congress enacted the '33 Act to prevent
1174
SEVERABILITY OF CLAIMS
of the procedural safeguards of litigation in court.7 4 Arbitrators generally do
not issue opinions explaining the reasons for arbitration awards, and no re-
quirement exists for arbitrators to keep complete records of arbitration
proceedings.7 5 Moreover, arbitrators' interpretations of law are not subject
to judicial review in the federal courts. 76 The Wilko Court concluded that
the lack of procedural safeguards and the limited availability of review rendered
arbitration inconsistent with the '33 Act's policy of providing protection to
securities investors.
77
The Wilko doctrine is also consistent with the '34 Act's provision creating
exclusive jurisdiction in the federal courts over claims arising under the '34
Act." Similarly, the implication of various private rights of action indicates
that the courts construe a congressional intent that the '34 Act provide addi-
tional investor protections. 79 Therefore, federal courts have maintained that
exploitation of the public through the sale of unsound, fraudulent, and worthless securities. Id.
The '33 Act established a federally supervised scheme for the registration of publicly traded securities.
See id. at 2-3. The '33 Act also created remedies for fraud and misrepresentation in the sale
of securities. See id. at 6.
74. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 436-37.
75. See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 598
(1960) (arbitrators are under no obligation to courts to give reasons for awards); Bernhardt v.
Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198, 203 (1956) (courts cannot require arbitrators to disclose
facts or reasons supporting award); Sobel v. Hertz, Warner & Co., 469 F.2d 1211, 1214-15 (2d
Cir. 1972) (no general requirement exists that arbitrators explain reasons for awards); M. DoxE,
TnE LAW AND PRAcicc oF Co imicuL ARBrrAuTON § 29.06 (1968) (written opinions rarely
accompany commercial arbitration awards).
Arbitrators generally do not keep records of commercial arbitration proceedings. See M.
DOMicE, supra, § 24.07 (parties generally do not require taking of records due to expenses in-
volved and limited usefulness since courts will not review merits of case). Parties' concern for
speed and finality of controversy settlement constitutes the main policy underlying arbitrators'
practice of not issuing written opinions. Id. § 29.06. A detailed written opinion might expose
the reasoning behind an arbitration award to challenge in the courts and, thereby, jeopardize
both the speed and finality of arbitration proceedings. Id.
76. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 436-37; see Sobel v. Hertz, Warner & Co., 469 F.2d 1211, 1213
(2d Cir. 1972) (court cannot vacate arbitration award for mistaken interpretation of law, but
only for manifest disregard of law); see also M. DoMrE, supra note 75, § 33.02 (discussion of
restrictions on judicial challenge of arbitrators' awards); Disputes, supra note 2, at 146-48 (discussion
of limited methods for attack of arbitration awards). Section 10 of the Arbitration Act specifies
several permissible grounds for vacating arbitrator's awards including fraud, corruption or undue
means in procuring award, partiality or corruption on the part of an arbitrator, misconduct by
an arbitrator in refusing to postpone a hearing upon the showing of sufficient cause, an arbitrator's
refusal to hear pertinent evidence, and an arbitrator's actions in excess of powers. 9 U.S.C. §
10 (1982).
77. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 438.
78. See 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1982) (§ 27 of '34 Act creates exclusive federal jurisdiction);
see also Sibley v. Tandy Corp., 543 F.2d 540, 543 (5th Cir. 1976) (preservation of exclusive federal
jurisdiction over '34 Act claims requires denial of enforcement of predispute arbitration agreements),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 824 (1977); Shapiro v. Jaslow, 320 F. Supp. 598, 600 (S.D.N.Y. 1970)
(enforcement of arbitration agreements could render federal courts' exclusive jurisdiction over
'34 Act claims meaningless).
79. See Reader v. Hirsch & Co., 197 F. Supp. 111, 114-15 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) (implication
of private rights of action under various '34 Act sections evidences congressional intent to protect
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the policy reasons for denying enforcement of predispute arbitration agreements
under the '33 Act are equally applicable to claims under the '34 Act.8 0
The Wilko doctrine, however, creates an exception to the provisions of
the federal Arbitration Act."1 The Arbitration Act, enacted under the authority
of the commerce clause,8 2 creates a body of federal substantive law applicable
in state and federal courts. 3 Section 2 of the Arbitration Act declares that,
except for the limitations on enforcement of any contract, written arbitration
agreements are valid, irrevocable, and enforceable. 4 The Wilko doctrine, while
recognizing the general contractual validity of predispute arbitration clauses,
declares predispute arbitration agreements void and unenforceable with respect
to federal securities claims.8 5 Congress enacted the Arbitration Act to over-
come a common-law principle that traditionally denied specific enforcement
of written arbitration agreements. 6 The Arbitration Act placed arbitration
agreements on equal footing with other contracts. 7 Congress passed the Ar-
bitration Act to allow parties to contract to avoid the expense and delay of
litigating future disputes." Courts consistently have construed the scope of
arbitration agreements liberally to give full effect to the congressional policy
underlying the Arbitration Act. 9 The Wilko doctrine represents an exception
investors). In J.L Case Co. v. Borak, the Supreme Court implied a private right of action to
sue for damages caused by a misleading proxy solicitation in violation of § 14(a) of the '34 Act.
377 U.S. 426, 433-35 (1964); see 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1982) (§ 14(a) of '34 Act). The Borak Court
reasoned that the '34 Act's policy of protecting investors implies the availability of judicial relief
where necessary to protect investors. 317 U.S. at 431-33. Similarly, the Supreme Court acknowledged
the availability of a private right of action under § 10(b) of the '34 Act and rule lOb-5 in Superinten-
dent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co. 404 U.S. 6, 11-12 (1971); see 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)
(1982) (§ 10(b) of '34 Act); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1983) (rule 10b-5). Recently, however, the
Supreme Court has taken a more restrictive approach toward implying private rights of action
under the provisions of the '34 Act. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S.
723, 729-30 (1975) (absent clear indication that Congress intended statute to provide private remedy,
courts should hesitate to imply private remedy); see also Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441
U.S. 677, 735-36 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting) (implication of private rights of action constitutes
aberrant interpretation of the '34 Act).
80. See supra notes 73-79 (discussion of policies of '33 and '34 Acts).
81. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982).
82. U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
83. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 104 S.Ct. 852, 858-59 (1984) (Arbitration Act requires
that California state court enforce predispute arbitration agreement despite state statute man-
dating judicial resolution of franchise dispute).
84. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
85. See supra notes 29-44 and accompanying text (discussion of Wilko doctrine). The Wilko
Court assumed the contractual validity of the arbitration agreement between the parties. See 346
U.S. at 429-30.
86. S. REP. No. 536, supra note 12, at 2; H.R. REP. No. 96, supra note 12, at 1-2.
87. H.R. REP. No. 96, supra note 12, at 1.
88. S. .RnP. No. 536, supra note 12, at 3; H.R. REP. No. 96, supra note 12, at 2.
89. See Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402, 411 (2d Cir. 1959)
(court held that arbitration clause covering contract controversies included charge of fraud in
inducement); Janmort Leasing, Inc. v. EconoCan Int'l, Inc., 475 F. Supp. 1282, 1291-92 (E.D.N.Y.
1979) (court held that clause requiring arbitration of any controversy or claim arising out of,
or relating to, contract applied to claims of breach of fiduciary duty, tortious interference with
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to the enforcement of the provisions of the Arbitration Act to the extent that
the doctrine precludes the enforcement of contractually valid predispute
agreements to arbitrate federal securities claims." Since securities disputes often
contain both state and federal claims, courts must determine whether state-
based securities claims are subject to arbitration pursuant to valid arbitration
agreements or whether the Wilko doctrine requires the parties to litigate state
claims concurrently with related nonarbitrable federal securities claims.9"
The Fifth Circuit has decided that, despite the existence of a valid agree-
ment to arbitrate future claims, courts should exercise jurisdiction to review
both the state and federal claims presented in a securities dispute when the
state claims are intertwined with the federal claims.92 In Miley v. Oppenheimer
& Co.,93 an investor alleged that the defendant investment company had
"churned ' 94 the investor's account in violation of the investment company's
common-law fiduciary duty to the investor, section 10(b) of the '34 Act, and
rule 10b-5.9s The Miley court refused to enforce a valid predispute arbitration
contractual relationships, common-law unconscionability, and unjust enrichment). Federal courts
recognize a strong federal policy to encourage the arbitration of disputes. See Seaboard Coast
Line R.R. v. Trailer Train Co., 690 F.2d 1343, 1348 (1lth Cir. 1982) (federal policy favoring
arbitration over litigation requires courts to construe arbitration clauses to resolve all doubts
in favor of arbitration); Stateside Mach. Co. v. Alperin, 591 F.2d 234, 240 (3d Cir. 1979) (Arbitration
Act embodies federal policy of promoting arbitration); Southwest Indus. Import & Export, Inc.
v. Wilmod Co., 524 F.2d 468, 470 (5th Cir. 1975) (courts should give full effect to arbitration
agreements to effectuate intent of parties and ease court congestion); DeCosta v. Columbia Broad-
casting Sys., Inc., 520 F.2d 499, 505 (Ist Cir. 1975) (adoption of Arbitration Act transformed
judicial hostility toward arbitration to general approval of arbitration), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1073 (1976). Courts, therefore, have construed a strong federal policy favoring the liberal en-
forcement of arbitration agreements. See Galt v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co., 376 F.2d 711,
714 (7th Cir. 1967) (courts should construe arbitration clauses by resolving every doubt in favor
of arbitration); Lundgren v. Freeman, 307 F.2d 104, 111 (9th Cir. 1962) (Arbitration Act's policy
of promoting arbitration requires liberal interpretation of arbitration agreements).
90. See supra notes 29-44 and accompanying text (discussion of Wilko doctrine).
91. See infra notes 92-126 and accompanying text (discussion of differing approaches of
courts to determine jurisdiction over mixed claims disputes).
92. See Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., 637 F.2d 318, 335-36 (5th Cir. 1981) (common-law
claim of breach of fiduciary duty litigated with rule lOb-5 claim).
93. 637 F.2d 318 (5th Cir. 1981).
94. Id. at 324. To prove a claim of churning in violation of § 10(b) of the '34 Act and
rule lOb-5 an investor must show that the trading of the investor's account was excessive in light
of the investor's objectives, that the defendant broker exercised control over the trading of the
investor's account, and that the broker acted with the intent to defraud the investor or with
reckless disregard for the investor's interests. Id.; see 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982); 17 C.F.R. §
240.10b-5 (1983). See generally Note, Churning By Securities Dealers, 80 H. v. L. Rav. 869
(1967) (discussion of churning of securities investment accounts).
95. Miley, 637 F.2d at 324. In Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., an investor alleged that the
defendant investment firm had engaged in excessive trading of the investor's assets in light of
the investor's stated goals of conservative income and growth. Id. at 325. The defendant invest-
ment firm defended on the grounds that the investor had expressed a desire for a high rate of
return through aggressive trading of the investor's discretionary account. Id. Both the investor
and the investment firm presented expert testimony concerning the transactions in the investor's
account. Id. The investor had an expert testify that the transactions in the investor's account
were excessive in size and frequency in light of the conservative investment objectives of the in-
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agreement, and held that the parties should resolve the entire dispute in court
because the investor's state-based claim of violation of a fiduciary duty and
the federal securities claims were sufficiently intertwined. 96 The Miley court
reasoned that when the same ultimate facts underlie both the state and federal
claims, federal courts should resolve the entire dispute to protect the exclusive
jurisdiction of the federal courts over '34 Act claims. 7 The Fifth Circuit con-
cluded that state and federal securities claims rest on the same ultimate facts
when the resolution of each claim requires a court to draw the same legal
and factual conclusions from common evidentiary facts.9
As the Miley court reasoned, the intertwining doctrine protects the exclusive
jurisdiction of the federal courts over claims arising under the '34 Act.99 Allow-
ing the arbitration of state claims based on the same ultimate facts as federal
securities claims threatens the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts through
the potential application of collateral estoppel to bind federal courts to an
arbitrator's prior resolution of a central issue of the federal securities claims. 00
vestor. Id. The investment f'rm presented expert testimony that the transactions in the investor's
account were reasonable in light of the speculative objectives of the investor. Id. A jury deter-
mined that the investment company had churned the investor's account in violation of both the
federal securities law and the Texas common-law fiduciary duty of investment brokers. Id.
96. Id. at 335-37. The Miley court concluded that resolutions of the investor's churning
claim under rule lob-5 and breach of fiduciary duty claim under common law both relied on
the same ultimate issues. Id. at 336. The ultimate issues underlying both the state and federal
claims were whether the trading of the investor's account was excessive, whether the investment
company controlled the account, and whether any excessive trading was willful or reckless. Id.
97. Id. at 335-36. The Miley court reasoned that arbitration of the investor's state-based
claim of breach of fiduciary duty would threaten the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts
over the investor's rule lob-5 claim because the resolution of each claim relies on the same ultimate
issues, and a federal court would be bound, through collateral estoppel, by an arbitrator's prior
resolution of those issues. Id. at 336. The investment firm argued that the investor had alleged
distinct causes of action and that courts should apply the intertwining doctrine only to "legally
intertwined" claims. Id. at 335. The investment firm asserted that claims are legally intertwined
only when the legal issues are so inseparable as to constitute a single cause of action. Id. The
Miley court rejected the concept of legal intertwining as unduly restrictive and, therefore, not
consistent with the intertwining doctrine's policy of promoting judicial efficiency Id.
98. Id. at 335-36.
99. See id. at 336. The Fifth Circuit reasoned that the use of collateral estoppel to bind
federal courts to arbitrators' decisions of issues common to nonarbitrable federal claims and
arbitrable state claims effectively destroys the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts over
federal securities claims. Id.; see 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1982) (§ 27 of the '34 Act creates exclusive
jurisdiction in federal courts over claims arising under '34 Act); see also supra note 78 (discussion
of rationale of courts employing intertwining doctrine).
100. See Behrens v. Skelly, 173 F.2d 715, 719-20 (3d Cir. 1949) (arbitration award disallow-
ing plaintiff's claim for breach of contract bars subsequent court proceeding for damages due
to breach of contract); Goldstein v. Doft, 236 F. Supp. 730, 734 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (court claim
for commissions on product sales allegedly due plaintiff disallowed because prior arbitration of
issues is binding as res judicata on court); Livingston v. Shreveport-Texas League Baseball Corp.,
128 F. Supp. 191, 202 (W.D. La. 1955) (execution of arbitration clause in baseball manager's
employment contract yields binding award having force of res judicata); see also RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND) OF JUDGMENTS § 84 (1982) (valid and final award by arbitration has same effect under
rules of res judicata as judgment by court); 18 C. WRiGHT, A. MILER & E. CooPEin, FEDERAL
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Arguably, the intertwining doctrine also promotes judicial efficiency.' 1 Since
the intertwining doctrine enables federal courts to resolve a securities dispute
in its entirety, parties to the litigation may avoid the needless repetition of
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4475 (1981) (principles of issue and claim preclusion generally are
applicable to arbitration decisions); M. DomKE, supra note 75, § 39.04 (rules of res judicata and
collateral estoppel apply to judgments rendered upon arbitration award).
Prior court decisions bind arbitrators through collateral estoppel. See Buffalo Forge Co.
v. United Steelworkers of Am., 428 U.S. 397, 412 (1976) (Court refused to issue injunction against
striking union workers because labor contract contained arbitration clause and Court's inter-
pretation of legal and factual issues in injunction proceeding would bind arbitrators in subse-
quent proceedings); Dickinson v. Heinold Sec., Inc., 661 F.2d 638, 644 (7th Cir. 1981) (federal
court's determination of issues in federal securities suit binds arbitrators); New York State Ass'n
for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, 456 F. Supp. 85, 96 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (court denied declaratory
judgment in ancillary proceeding arising out of civil rights suit by mentally retarded state residents
against New York State Department of Mental Health officials because some claims were referable
to arbitration and court's decisions would bind arbitrators in subsequent proceedings); Stockwell
v. Reynolds & Co., 252 F. Supp. 215, 220 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (outcome of subsequent arbitration
is dependent on court's determination of federal securities issues).
101. See Cunningham v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 550 F. Supp. 578, 582 (E.D. Cal.
1982) (severance of related claims would create inefficiencies by requiring duplication of presen-
tation of evidence). In Cunningham v. Dean Witter Reynolds,'Inc. an investor brought suit in
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California alleging that the brokerage
firm of Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. and two of the firm's employees had made deceptive and
misleading statements concerning the risk and expected return of a particular investment scheme
to induce the investor to open a securities investment account. Id. at 578-79. The investor asserted
federal securities claims based on §§ 10(b) and 15(c) of the '34 Act and state-based tort claims
of fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, negligent misrepresentation, and intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress. Id. at 578. The investment firm moved for an order to sever the state tort claims
and stay judicial proceedings on the federal claims pending the completion of arbitration pro-
ceedings pursuant to a predispute arbitration agreement between the parties. Id. at 578-79. The
district court invoked the intertwining doctrine to establish federal jurisdiction over the state-
based claims and accordingly denied the investment firm's motion to compel arbitration of the
tort claims. Id. at 585.
The Cunningham court adopted the Fifth Circuit's intertwining doctrine and explicitly re-
jected the sever and stay approach of the Seventh Circuit. Id. at 584-85; see Dickinson v. Heinold
Sec., Inc., 661 F.2d 638, 645-46 (7th Cir. 1981) (Seventh Circuit rejected intertwining doctrine,
severed state-based claims from federal securities claims, and submitted state claims to arbitra-
tion following judicial resolution of federal claims); Miley v. Oppenheimer, 637 F.2d 318, 335-36
(5th Cir. 1981) (Fifth Circuit adopted intertwining doctrine); see also supra notes 92-98 and
accompanying text (discussion of Miley decision); infra notes 105-115 and accompanying text
(discussion of Dickinson decision). The Cunningham court held that the Arbitration Act does
not require the enforcement of arbitration agreements when arbitrable state-based securities claims
are intertwined with nonarbitrable federal securities claims. 550 F. Supp. at 583. The district
court maintained that Congress intended § 3 of the Arbitration Act, which allows a stay of court
proceedings on arbitrable claims, to apply to suits upon solely arbitrable issues. Id. at 583 &
n.4; see 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1982) (§ 3 of Arbitration Act permits courts to stay proceedings on ar-
bitrable issues). The Cunningham court accordingly concluded that § 3 of the Arbitration Act
does not compel bifurcation of securities disputes presenting both arbitrable state-based claims
ahd nonarbitrable federal claims. 550 F. Supp. at 583. Furthermore, the Cunningham court reasoned
that the sever and stay approach is inconsistent with the Arbitration Act's policy of encouraging
the quick and inexpensive resolution of disputes because application of the sever and stay ap-
proach would require parties to present identical evidence to prove the same legal and factual
claims in two separate proceedings. Id. at 584.
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the presentation of identical evidence in arbitration proceedings. 02 Moreover,
the intertwining doctrine eliminates the possibility that federal courts and
arbitrators may render inconsistent decisions on identical or similar claims. 03
Courts employing the intertwining doctrine recognize that the litigation of state-
based securities claims with related federal securities claims furthers the policies
of judicial efficiency, protection of exclusive federal jurisdiction over '34 Act
claims, and avoidance of inconsistent decisions.1
0 4
Not all courts, however, have adopted the intertwining doctrine.'0 5 In
Dickinson v. Heinold Securities, Inc.,'16 the Seventh Circuit rejected the in-
tertwining doctrine. 07 The Dickinson court held that district courts should
enforce valid arbitration agreements by requiring the arbitration of state-based
securities claims, irrespective of the joinder of those claims with nonarbitrable
federal claims.'00 In Dickinson, an investor brought suit in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois against a broker claiming
that the broker had failed to trade the investor's account in accordance with
certain preselected strategies contained in a written agreement between the
broker and the investor. '0 9 The investor alleged damages based on the broker's
violation of section 10(b) of the '34 Act and rule 10b-5."1 The investor also
alleged various state law tort and contract claims based upon essentially the
same facts as the federal securities claims."' The Dickinson court reasoned
that an application of the intertwining doctrine would frustrate the strong
federal policy favoring arbitration because the doctrine would preclude the
arbitration of the state claims pursuant to a valid predispute arbitration agree-
ment between the parties." 2 Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit severed the state
law contract and tort claims from the federal securities claims and ordered
102. 550 F. Supp. at 584.
103. Id.
104. See id. at 582; Miley, 637 F.2d at 336.
105. See infra notes 106-126 and accompanying text (discussion of courts adopting sever
and stay approach).
106. 661 F.2d 638 (7th Cir. 1981).
107. Id. at 643-44.
108. Id. at 646.
109. Id. at 639-40.
110. Id. at 640. In Dickinson v. Heinold Sec., Inc., an investor opened a stock options in-
vestment account with the defendant, Heinold Securities, Inc. Id. at 639. The investor and Heinold
executed a written agreement giving Heinold a limited discretionary power to trade the investor's
account on the Chicago Board Options Exchange. Id. Approximately one year after opening
the account, the investor withdrew the bulk of his funds and informed Heinold that he believed
that Heinold had not traded the account in accordance with the investment strategies specified
in the written agreement between the parties. Id. at 640. The investor subsequently filed suit
in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. Id. at 640. The investor
alleged that Heinold's conduct had violated the agreement between the parties. Id. The investor
also alleged that Heinold had violated § 10(b) of the '34 Act and rule lOb-5 by making misrepresen-
tations in soliciting and trading the investor's account to maximize Heinold's profits from com-
missions. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 644.
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a stay of arbitration of the state claims pending judicial resolution of the federal
claims."' The Dickinson court noted that the "sever and stay" approach
preserves the federal courts' exclusive jurisdiction over '34 Act claims because
a stay of the arbitration proceedings eliminates the possibility that an
arbitrator's decisions would bind a federal court through collateral estoppel."
4
Furthermore, the Dickinson court claimed that the availability of detailed
findings of fact, special verdicts, and the use of collateral estoppel to avoid
duplication of efforts could minimize any inefficiencies attributable to bifur-
cation of a securities dispute."'
The Sixth Circuit recently adopted the sever and stay approach of the
Dickinson court." 6 In Liskey v. Oppenheimer & Co.," 7 an investor alleged
that the defendant investment firm had churned the investor's account in viola-
tion of various provisions of the '34 Act, stock exchange and association rules,
state statutes, and common law. 18 The investment firm moved to sever the
state-based claims and compel arbitration of those claims." 9 The United States
District Court for the Western District of Michigan denied the defendant's
motion.' 20 The Sixth Circuit, however, reversed and compelled severance and
113. Id. at 646.
114. Id. at 644.
115. Id.; see supra note 100 (application of doctrine of collateral estoppel to arbitration
awards). The Dickinson court asserted that the alleged inefficiencies of a bifurcated securities
dispute resolution system are speculative. 661 F.2d at 644. The Seventh Circuit reasoned that,
in addition to the application of collateral estoppel to limit inefficiencies, plaintiffs who prevail
in federal court on federal securities claims may have no need to pursue the resolution of ar-
bitrable state claims because they would have previously recovered their damages. Id. But see
supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text (plaintiffs may pursue state-based claims to recover
punitive damages). Furthermore, the Dickinson court commented that the determination of issues
of fact in a federal trial may facilitate the settlement of state-based claims prior to arbitration.
661 F.2d at 644.
116. See infra notes 117-126 and accompanying text (discussion of Liskey case).
117. 717 F.2d 314 (6th Cir. 1983).
118. Id. at 315. In Liskey v. Oppenheimer & Co., an investor opened several types of invest-
ment accounts with the defendant investment firm, Oppenheimer & Co., Inc. Id. The investor
signed a margin agreement and a "Client's Option Agreement" upon opening the accounts. Id.
The terms of each of these agreements included a provision whereby the investor agreed to arbitrate
any dispute pertaining to Oppenheimer's handling of the investor's account. Id. at 315 & nn.
1 & 2. The investor alleged that one of Oppenheimer's brokers had induced the investor to invest
more than $100,000 in a bond option program by giving specific assurances of the investment's
low-risk nature. Id. at 315. Within one year, the investor's account was worth approximately
$30,000. Id. The investor filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western District
of Michigan alleging fraudulent misrepresentation of material facts by Oppenheimer and the broker
in violation of various provisions of the '34 Act, stock exchange and association rules, state statutes,
and common law. Liskey v. Oppenheimer & Co., [1981-82 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REp.
(CCH) 98,419, at 92,507-08 (,V.D. Mich. 1982), rev'd, 717 F.2d 314 (6th Cir. 1983).
119. Liskey v. Oppenheimer & Co., [1981-82 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. RP. (CCH)
98,419, at 92,508-09 (W.D. Mich. 1982), rev'd, 717 F.2d 314 (6th Cir. 1983).
120. Id. at 92,512. The district court in Liskey relied on the Sixth Circuit's decision in Mansbach
v. Prescott, Ball & Turben to decide that the court should consolidate the investor's state and
federal claims and try all claims in one proceeding. Id. at 92,508-09; see Mansbach v. Prescott,
Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017, 1030-31 (6th Cir. 1979) (court consolidated and tried '34 Act
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arbitration of the state-based claims following judicial resolution of the federal
securities claims.2 The Liskey court concluded that the sever and stay approach
maintains the proper balance between the competing policies of the Arbitra-
tion Act and the '34 Act.'22 Noting that section 3 of the Arbitration Act pro-
vides for a stay of court proceedings on issues referable to arbitration pur-
suant to a valid written agreement, the Liskey court concluded that severance
and arbitration of state claims accomplishes the Arbitration Act's policy of
providing an efficient and inexpensive dispute resolution process. 3 The Liskey
court acknowledged that a stay of arbitration pending the completion of litiga-
tion of federal claims protects the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts
over '34 Act claims.' 24 The Sixth Circuit further asserted that the alleged inef-
ficiencies of bifurcated proceedings are speculative.'25 For example, plaintiffs
claims, state statutory fraud claim, and common-law fraud claim because all based on alleged
mishandling of investor's option account by broker's purchase of incorrect number of options
on wrong day). In Mansbach, the Sixth Circuit consolidated and tried state and federal securities
claims resulting from a broker's mishandling of an investor's option account. 598 F.2d at 1030-31.
The Mansbach court held that courts should decide state and federal securities claims containing
substantially the same elements because arbitration of the state claims based on the same facts
as the federal claims would be duplicative. Id. at 1030.
121. Liskey, 717 F.2d at 321.
122. Id. at 320. The Sixth Circuit in Liskey effectively discarded the intertwining approach
of Mansbach in favor of the sever and stay approach. Id. at 320 & n.8a.; see supra note 120
(discussion of Mansbach decision).
123. 717 F.2d at 320. But see Cunningham v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 550 F. Supp.
578, 583 & n.4 (E.D. Cal. 1982) (§ 3 of Arbitration Act applies only to court proceedings on
solely arbitrable claims); supra note 101 (discussion of Cunningham decision).
124. 717 F.2d at 320.
125. Id. In Liskey, the Sixth Circuit maintained that, even if the sever and stay approach
results in some duplication of proof, the Supreme Court's decision in Moses H. Cone Memorial
Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Co. recognized that the Arbitration Act requires piecemeal litigation
when necessary to give effect to an arbitration agreement. Id.; see Moses H. Cone Memorial
Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Co., 103 S.Ct. 927 (1983). In Moses H. Cone, a hospital contracted
with Mercury Construction Company for the construction of additions to the hospital building.
103 S.Ct. at 931. The contract contained a provision whereby the parties agreed to refer all disputes
involving interpretation of the contract or performance of the construction work to an indepen-
dent architectural firm that the hospital had employed to design and oversee the construction
project. Id. According to the terms of the contract, the parties could submit disputes to binding
arbitration upon demand of either party following the architectural firm's resolution of the dispute
or the architectural firm's failure to decide the dispute within 10 days. Id. at 931 & n.2. During
construction, Mercury submitted claims to the architectural firm for increased costs caused by
delays and inaction by the hospital. Id. at 932. The architectural firm never resolved the claims.
Id. The hospital filed suit in state court against Mercury and the architectural firm alleging that
Mercury's claims were without factual or legal basis. Id. The hospital also alleged that Mercury
had lost its right to arbitration because of waiver, laches, estoppel, and failure to make a timely
demand for arbitration. Id. The hospital's complaint also alleged various delinquencies on the
part of the architectural firm. Id. As relief, the hospital sought declarations that Mercury had
no right to demand arbitration, that the hospital bore no liability to Mercury, and that, if the
court should find the hospital liable, the hospital would be entitled to indemnification from the
architectural firm. Id.
The hospital obtained an injunction from the state court prohibiting Mercury from arbitrating
its claims against the hospital. Id. Mercury filed suit in the United States District Court for the
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who recover damages in court may have no need to pursue the arbitration
of related claims.
26
As a result of the SEC's recent enactment of rule 15c2-2, the possibility
of increased litigation of securities disputes threatens to highlight the incon-
sistent approaches that federal courts have taken in considering the severability
of arbitrable state-based securities claims and nonarbitrable federal securities
claims. 127 Rule 15c2-2 requires brokers and dealers to inform investors that
predispute arbitration clauses are unenforceable with respect to federal securities
claims. 2 18 Since rule 15c2-2 effectively encourages the litigation of securities
disputes presenting state-based claims arising out of the same transactions as
federal securities claims, the consistent application of either the intertwining
doctrine or the sever and stay approach would enable courts to resolve the
potentially large number of future securities suits in a uniform manner.29
The intertwining doctrine and the sever and stay approach represent dif-
ferent balancings of the policies of the Arbitration Act and the federal securities
acts. '30 The chief purpose of the Arbitration Act is to require the enforcement
of agreements to submit disputes to arbitration. 3 ' The Arbitration Act thereby
evidences congressional support of arbitration as an economical and expeditious
alternative to litigation.' 32 The '33 and '34 Acts embody a policy of protec-
tion of investors from fraudulent and misleading practices in the sale and
trading of securities. 3 The Wilko doctrine creates an exception to the provi-
sions of the Arbitration Act by rendering predispute arbitration agreements
Middle District of North Carolina to compel arbitration under § 4 of the Arbitration Act. Id.;
see 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1982) (§ 4 of the Arbitration Act permits party aggrieved by failure to arbitrate
in accordance with written agreement to petition any federal district court to compel arbitration).
The district court stayed Mercury's federal court suit pending completion of the state court suit
on the same issue of arbitrability of Mercury's claims. 103 S.Ct. at 933. The Fourth Circuit reversed
the district court's stay order and remanded the case to the district court with instructions for
entry of an order to arbitrate. Mercury Constr. Corp. v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 656
F.2d 933, 946 (4th Cir. 1981). The Supreme Court affirmed. 103 S.Ct. at 944.
The Supreme Court held that, even though the hospital's claim for indemnity from the
architectural firm was not subject to an arbitration agreement between the parties, Mercury's
claim against the hospital was subject to arbitration pursuant to the terms of the written agree-
ment between the parties. Id. at 939. The Supreme Court recognized that compelling arbitration
of the claim between the parties would require the hospital to resolve related disputes in different
forums. Id. The Supreme Court reasoned that the Arbitration Act "requires piecemeal resolution
when necessary to give effect to an arbitration agreement." Id. (emphasis in original).
126. Liskey, 717 F.2d at 320.
127. See supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text (discussion of rule 15c2-2).
128. 48 Fed. Reg. 53404 (1983) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-2); see supra notes
8-I1 and accompanying text (discussion of rule 15c2-2).
129. See supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text (discussion of rule 15c2-2).
130. See supra notes 92-126 and accompanying text (discussion of intertwining doctrine and
sever and stay approach).
131. H.R. REP. No. 96, supra note 12, at 1-2; supra note 12 (discussion of Arbitration Act).
132. S. REP. No. 536, supra note 12, at 3. Businesses and individuals support the resolution
of disputes through arbitration. Id. Arbitration allows parties to avoid the delay and expense
of litigation. Id.
133. S. REP. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1933).
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void and unenforceable with respect to claims arising under the federal securities
acts.' 34 The Supreme Court's concern with furthering the policy of investor
protection constitutes the basis for the Wilko doctrine's exception to the
Arbitration Act's policy of enforcement of valid arbitration agreements.'
In determining-the appropriate forum for deciding state claims based on the
same facts as federal securities claims, courts must consider the policies of
the Arbitration Act and the federal securities acts.' 36 Courts adopting the intert-
wining doctrine have concluded that maintenance of exclusive federal jurisdic-
tion over '34 Act claims, furtherance of the Wilko doctrine's protection of
investors, and judicial efficiency arguments support the extension of federal
court jurisdiction to decide state claims based on the same facts as federal
securities claims despite the existence of valid arbitration agreements.' 37 In
contrast, courts adopting the sever and stay approach limit the application
of the Wilko doctrine to federal securities claims and accordingly further the
policy of the Arbitration Act by requiring arbitration of state-based claims
pursuant to valid arbitration agreements.' 38
To the extent that the sever and stay approach gives effect to the policies
underlying both the federal securities acts and the Arbitration Act, the sever
and stay approach is preferable to the intertwining doctrine, which protects
only the policies underlying the federal securities acts. 39 The sever and stay
approach gives general effect to the right of parties to contract for the
134. See supra notes 92-104 and accompanying text (discussion of intertwining doctrine).
135. See Wilko, 346 U.S. at 438.
136. See supra notes 92-126 and accompanying text (discussion of intertwining doctrine and
sever and stay approach).
137. See supra notes 92-104 and accompanying text (discussion of intertwining doctrine)
138. See supra notes 105-126 and accompanying text (discussion of sever and stay approach).
139. See infra notes 140-157 and accompanying text (discussion of advantages of sever and
stay approach over intertwining doctrine). Recent Supreme Court decisions favoring the enforce-
ment of arbitration agreements lend indirect support to the conclusion that the sever and stay
approach represents a proper balancing of the policies underlying the federal securities acts and
the Arbitration Act. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 104 S.Ct. 852, 858-59 (1984) (Arbitration
Act requires enforcement of predispute arbitration agreement despite state statute mandating judicial
resolution of dispute); Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Co., 103 S.Ct. 927,
941-42 (1983) (parties should arbitrate construction contract dispute pursuant to predispute agree-
ment); see also supra note 125 (discussion of Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp.). In Southland
Corp. v. Keating, Keating, a franchisee of The Southland Corporation, filed a class action suit
against Southland, owner and franchiser of 7-Eleven convenience stores, on behalf of approx-
imately 800 California franchisees of Southland. Southland Corp., 104 S.Ct. at 855. Keating
filed suit in California Superior Court alleging fraud, oral misrepresentation, breach of contract,
breach of fiduciary duty, and violation of the disclosure requirements of the California Franchise
Investment Law (franchise law). Id.; see CAL. CoRp. CODE §§ 31000-31516. (West 1977). Southland
petitioned to compel arbitration of all claims pursuant to the terms of Southland's standard fran-
chise agreement whereby each franchisee had agreed to the arbitration of any future dispute arising
out of the franchise agreement. 104 S.Ct. at 855. The superior court ordered arbitration of all
claims except those claims arising under the franchise law. Id. The California Court of Appeal
reversed the trial court's refusal to compel arbitration of the franchise law claims. Keating v.
Superior Court, 109 Cal. App. 3d 784, -, 167 Cal. Rptr. 481, 493-94 (1980). The California
Supreme Court reversed and held that claims under the franchise law are not arbitrable. Keating
v. Superior Court, 31 Cal. 3d 584, 614, 645 P.2d 1192, 1210, 183 Cal. Rptr. 360, 378 (1982).
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arbitration of potential future disputes, while it requires courts to recognize
a limited exception regarding the nonarbitrability of federal securities claims.'
4 0
Moreover, the SEC generally endorses arbitration as an efficient and economical
securities dispute resolution procedure. 14' The goals of the Wilko doctrine are
the maintenance of exclusive federal jurisdiction over '34 Act claims and the
protection of investors through disallowance of predispute waivers of forum
choice provisions of the '33 Act.' 2 Application of the intertwining doctrine
is unnecessary to accomplish the goals of the Wilko doctrine, and, therefore,
constitutes an unwarranted extension of the Wilko doctrine.' 43 A stay of
arbitration proceedings pending judicial resolution of federal securities claims
protects the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts over '34 Act claims.
44
Furthermore, application of the sever and stay approach does not affect an
investor's right to select a forum for litigation of '33 Act claims because only
the investor's state-based claims are subject to arbitration. 45 Arguably,
severance of state claims from related federal claims encourages inefficient
and inconsistent dispute resolutions.' 6 However, the application of collateral
estoppel could reduce the potential inefficiencies attributable to a bifurcated
system of securities dispute resolution.'
47
The California Supreme Court held that predispute arbitration agreements are void with respect
to the franchise law because § 31512 of the franchise law voids any condition, stipulation, or
provision purporting to bind any franchisee to waive compliance with any provision of the fran-
chise law. Id. at 599-600, 645 P.2d at 1200-01, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 368-69; see CAL. CORP. CODE
§ 31512 (West 1977) (nonwaiver provision). The United States Supreme Court reversed. 104 S.Ct.
at 861. The Supreme Court held that the California Supreme Court's interpretation of § 31512
of the franchise law directly conflicts with § 2 of the Arbitration Act and, therefore, violates
the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution. Id. at 858-59; see 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1982)
(§ 2 of the Arbitration Act declares written arbitration agreements to be valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable); see also U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, ci.2 (supremacy clause allows federal law to preempt
conflicting state laws). The Supreme Court held that the Arbitration Act constitutes substantive
federal law applicable in both state and federal courts. 104 S.Ct. at 861. The Supreme Court,
therefore, reasoned that congressional enactment of the Arbitration Act withdrew the power of
the states to require the judicial resolution of claims that parties have contracted to arbitrate.
Id. at 858-59.
140. See supra notes 105-126 and accompanying text (discussion of sever and stay approach).
141. See SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-15984 (July 2, 1979), reprinted in
[1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 82,122, at 81,976 (SEC generally believes that
arbitration is an economical and efficient means of resolving existing securities disputes). In 1977,
the SEC established the Securities Industry Conference on Arbitration (SICA) to develop and
implement uniform, fair, and efficient procedures for the resolution of securities disputes. See
SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-13470 (April 26, 1977), reprinted in [1977-78 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 81,136, at 87,905. The SICA has developed an arbitration
procedure for resolving investor claims of $2500 or less. See Third Report of the Securities In-
dustry Conference on Arbitration to the Securities and Exchange Commission (January 31, 1980).
Additionally, the SICA has drafted a Uniform Code of Arbitration. See id.
142. See supra notes 29-48 and accompanying text (discussion of Wilko doctrine).
143. See Disputes, supra note 2, at 145-46 (discussion of intertwining doctrine).
144. See supra notes 105-126 and accompanying text (discussion of sever and stay approach).
145. See id.
146. See id.
147. See supra note 100 and accompanying test (discussion of application of collateral estoppel
to arbitration decisions).
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The sever and stay approach is easy to apply.' 4s Courts merely must
distinguish the federal securities claims from the state-based claims and pro-
ceed to litigate the federal claims. 4 9 In contrast, application of the intertwin-
ing doctrine requires courts to determine whether state and federal claims are
sufficiently intertwined to merit the exercise of jurisdiction to decide all
claims."5 The federal courts have not been consistent in their determination
of what constitutes sufficient intertwining. '5 Furthermore, the use of court
time to determine the preliminary question of the degree of intertwining under-
cuts the efficiency arguments in favor of application of the intertwining
doctrine.' 2
The sever and stay approach serves the policies of the federal securities
acts by preserving the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts over '34 Act
claims and protecting investors by upholding the Wilko doctrine's require-
ment that predispute arbitration agreements shall not bind investors to arbitrate
federal securities claims. 53 The sever and stay approach also gives effect to
the policies of the Arbitration Act by requiring arbitration of valid state
securities claims. 'i Moreover, courts may apply the sever and stay approach
easily and consistently to resolve securities disputes involving both state and
federal claims. 5 5 Since the effect of the SEC's rule 15c2-2 may be to increase
the volume of future securities litigation involving both arbitrable and nonar-
bitrable claims, courts now should establish a consistent approach for deter-
mining the proper forum for resolution of arbitrable state-based securities
claims.1 5 6 To the extent that the sever and stay approach represents a proper
balancing of federal policies underlying the federal securities acts and the Ar-
bitration Act, courts uniformly should reject the intertwining doctrine and
adopt the sever and stay approach.' 57
KEVIN J. BUCKLEY
148. See supra notes 105-126 and accompanying text (discussion of sever and stay approach).
149. See id.
150. See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text (discussion of varying applications of
intertwining doctrine).
151. See id. Skillful pleading should produce enough intertwining between state law fraud
and misrepresentation claims and federal securities claims to preclude arbitration. Dickinson v.
Heinold Sec., Inc., 661 F.2d 638, 646 (7th Cir. 1981).
152. See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text (discussion of varying applications of
intertwining doctrine). Arguably, the intertwining doctrine is inefficient because it requires federal
courts to decide state law issues. See supra notes 92-104 and accompanying text (discussion of
intertwining doctrine).
153. See supra notes 105-126 and accompanying text (discussion of sever and stay approach).
154. See id.
155. See id.
156. See supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text (discussion of rule 15c2-2).
157. See supra text accompanying notes 139-156 (discussion of advantages of sever and stay
approach over intertwining doctrine).
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